From 58c9ebace290fefec2b49513216217474b19cf1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergio Demian Lerner Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 18:47:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Move past the libz-sys heap-overflow advisory RUSTSEC-2026-0544 / CVE-2026-85091, published 11 November: a heap buffer overflow in zlib gz_vacate(), reachable by calling gzprintf() or gzvprintf() on a non-blocking gzFile after a write stall. A patch bump within the same minor clears it, 1.1.31 to 1.1.33, so no deny.toml exception is needed and none is added. The node was never exploitable through it, and the bump is hygiene rather than a fix. libz-sys enters only through librocksdb-sys, which uses zlib raw deflate/inflate stream API for block compression and never the gzip-file API the overflow lives in. Our own gzip use goes through flate2 on the miniz_oxide and zlib-rs backends, which are pure Rust and do not link libz-sys at all; flate2 exposes no gzprintf equivalent, the only callers read and write operator-supplied local files, and that I/O is blocking. Nothing a peer sends reaches zlib by any route. Landing it anyway because a red advisory check teaches everyone to ignore advisory checks, and because it currently fails two external pull requests that did not cause it -- both inherit the lockfile from main. cargo deny check advisories: ok. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 --- Cargo.lock | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index 85f2380..cb523f3 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -2204,9 +2204,9 @@ dependencies = [ [[package]] name = "libz-sys" -version = "1.1.31" +version = "1.1.33" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "ff20308ecabd635a2dc1dd5834a86c462cca20efba1d5d3ddab1f8aea3455cb2" +checksum = "fee3f59f4321dab0c78d828942e7aa09d0bd8ad6e78a501977e6bf3d02938045" dependencies = [ "cc", "pkg-config",