v1.0.2 (versionCode 3) is the final and only supported release. Threshold was shelved on 2026-11-07 in a verified GREEN state; no further releases are planned under the current mandate (see the "Status: Shelved" banner in the README).

Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security tab → "Report a vulnerability"). Do not open a public issue for anything that touches:

• the crypto path (app/src/main/kotlin/com/threshold/app/crypto/),
• key custody / the vault,
• nostr event signing or relay handling,
• the escalation / duress / release flow.

For protocol-level issues that affect third-party implementations, also reference NIP-3078 (threshold-docs/NIP.md in the private AutomatedLabor/threshold-docs repo; contact the repository owner for access).

This project is shelved: there is no active on-call, and response is best-effort by the maintainer. Issues in the crypto or escalation path will be triaged before any hypothetical resume of development; they will not be silently ignored, but do not expect a patched release under the current mandate.

These are recorded so nobody has to rediscover them:

1. Not hardened against state-actor adversaries. Contact npubs are visible on release events' p tags; a relay operator (or a party able to subpoena relay logs) can correlate contacts. Council iter-1 P0-2 scoped v1.0.x to personal/family threat models. Per-packet one-time recipient npubs are the v1.1+ mitigation (never shipped).
2. M-of-N quorum never shipped. v1.0.x is 1-of-1 packets only (iter-1 P0-17 deferred quorum to remove a race).
3. The nsec is not hardware-backed in v1.0.x. It lives in the vault, encrypted at rest with the BIP-39-derived key; a root-level attacker on the device could extract it. StrongBox enforcement for high-value packets was deferred (iter-1 P0-18).
4. Single watchdog assumption (iter-1 P0-5) and no constant-size heartbeat padding (metadata leak of cadence via event size, iter-1 §8.5).

Full detail: THREAT-MODEL.md in the private docs repo; council-iter-3/REPORT.md contains the Red-Team attack-tree walk-through against the shipped code.

• Integrity: sha256sum -c threshold-v1.0.2.apk.sha256 — must match 092969405e448753e98a78c9ef77a9401e034969bdddc85a89f18ad6761f4691.
• Signing: apksigner verify --print-certs --verbose threshold-v1.0.2.apk — expect Verifies, v1=true, v2=true, v3=true, CN=Threshold Release, O=AutomatedLabor, C=US, cert SHA-256 188da80dd8abac9d3f6969c0ac58b03e03115a58ce4234f50c4002e15cdce297.
• Do not use keytool -printcert -jarfile to judge installability: it inspects v1 JAR signing only and reports "Not a signed jar file" for properly-signed v2/v3-era APKs. This exact false negative cost the v1.0.1 release cycle (post-mortem).