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Move past the libz-sys heap-overflow advisory - #367
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RUSTSEC-2026-0544 / CVE-2026-85091, published 11 November: a heap buffer overflow in zlib gz_vacate(), reachable by calling gzprintf() or gzvprintf() on a non-blocking gzFile after a write stall. A patch bump within the same minor clears it, 1.1.31 to 1.1.33, so no deny.toml exception is needed and none is added. The node was never exploitable through it, and the bump is hygiene rather than a fix. libz-sys enters only through librocksdb-sys, which uses zlib raw deflate/inflate stream API for block compression and never the gzip-file API the overflow lives in. Our own gzip use goes through flate2 on the miniz_oxide and zlib-rs backends, which are pure Rust and do not link libz-sys at all; flate2 exposes no gzprintf equivalent, the only callers read and write operator-supplied local files, and that I/O is blocking. Nothing a peer sends reaches zlib by any route. Landing it anyway because a red advisory check teaches everyone to ignore advisory checks, and because it currently fails two external pull requests that did not cause it -- both inherit the lockfile from main. cargo deny check advisories: ok. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Upstream's four pull requests since 169ef57: the external IP looked up over HTTPS when --external-ip is not set (Rustock-dev#365), the node run from a prebuilt binary in Docker and configured from .env (Rustock-dev#366), libz-sys moved past its heap-overflow advisory (Rustock-dev#367), and CLAUDE.md on screening an outside pull request without running it (Rustock-dev#373). Three files conflicted: - crates/cli/Cargo.toml: both sides added tokio-rustls (ring, tls12) and webpki-roots, upstream's for the external-IP lookup and this branch's for --import. They are listed once, under one comment for both, beside this branch's serde_json and sha2. Cargo.lock gains no package over upstream's. - deny.toml: both sides rewrote the note on webpki-roots' licence. It now names every use: the external-IP lookup, Rootstock's server for --import, a stable minimum gas price's web source, and lettre under the smtp feature. - crates/cli/src/main.rs: both sides' modules are kept.
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RUSTSEC-2026-0544/CVE-2026-85091, published 11 November: a heap bufferoverflow in zlib's
gz_vacate(), reachable by callinggzprintf()orgzvprintf()on a non-blockinggzFileafter a write stall.A patch bump within the same minor clears it —
libz-sys 1.1.31 → 1.1.33.One
Cargo.lockline. Nodeny.tomlexception is added and none is needed.The node was never exploitable through this
The bump is hygiene, not a fix. Every link in the chain is broken:
libz-sysenters only throughlibrocksdb-sys, which uses zlib's rawdeflate/inflatestream API for block compression and never thegzip-file API the overflow lives in. The function is linked and never
called.
flate2here resolves to theminiz_oxide/zlib-rsbackends, which are pure Rust and do not linklibz-sys.flate2exposes nogzprintfequivalent, its onlycallers read and write operator-supplied local files, and that I/O is
blocking — where the advisory requires non-blocking mode plus a write
stall.
route.
So no restart is required. This reaches production whenever the node is next
deployed for an unrelated reason.
Why land it now
Two reasons, neither of them urgency:
A red advisory check teaches everyone to ignore advisory checks, and this one
will stay red on every branch until the lockfile moves.
And it currently fails two external pull requests that did not cause it —
#365 and #366 both inherit the lockfile from
main, so both are blocked by acheck that was never theirs.
How it surfaced, which is the part worth noting
main's last Security run passed on 15 November; the advisory landed on the11th and was picked up by the database afterwards. Nothing noticed, because
no workflow has run automatically on this repository since the migration —
every run so far has been a manual dispatch.
The Security workflow says why it exists in its own header:
That cron has not fired once here. It took an outside contributor's pull
request to surface a vulnerability in our own lockfile.
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