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Move past the lettre STARTTLS and dot-stuffing advisories - #375

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SergioDemianLerner merged 1 commit into
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fix/rustsec-2026-0560-lettre
Nov 18, 2026
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SergioDemianLerner merged 1 commit into
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fix/rustsec-2026-0560-lettre

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@SDL-A1 SDL-A1 commented Nov 18, 2026

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cargo-deny's advisories check fails on three RUSTSEC advisories published against lettre 0.11.23. The smtp feature builds it into rustock-alerts and so into the node binary, and that is the configuration the production node runs.

Advisory What it allows
RUSTSEC-2026-0560 A man-in-the-middle appends replies to the cleartext reply to STARTTLS; the client takes them for the server's replies to the commands it then sends over TLS, so a message the server rejected can be made to look accepted.
RUSTSEC-2026-0561 Missing dot-stuffing after a bare LF or CR allows SMTP command injection.
(third, same release) A panic on an EHLO reply line of only white space: a denial of service.

All three are fixed in 0.11.24.

RUSTSEC-2026-0560 affects STARTTLS connections only — Tls::Required and Tls::Opportunistic, which starttls_relay sets up and TlsMode::Starttls selects in crates/alerts/src/sink.rs. Implicit TLS (relay) is not affected. The production node is configured tls = "starttls" on port 587 with alerts enabled, so it is in the affected configuration. It was stopped pending this fix.

The change

cargo update -p lettre. Lockfile only, no manifest change:

  • lettre 0.11.23 -> 0.11.24
  • email-encoding 0.4.2 -> 0.4.3, which carries the dot-stuffing fix

Cargo's re-resolution also moves errno, rustix and tempfile from windows-sys 0.52.0 to 0.61.2. Both versions were already locked and both remain; --precise 0.11.24 produces the identical lockfile, so this is not avoidable by pinning harder.

Checked

  • Package count unchanged at 469, with nothing added or removed beyond those two version bumps.
  • cargo metadata --locked passes.
  • Every dependency outside the workspace still carries a checksum: 459 of 469, the other 10 being the workspace members, which is what the Security workflow asserts.

How it was found

By the advisories job on #374, not by the daily schedule in security.yml. That cron has never fired: the workflow is state=active with the file on the default branch and valid syntax, but there are 0 runs with event=schedule repository-wide since it was added on 11 September 2026. Worth filing separately: the schedule is the part meant to catch exactly this class of problem, advisories published against dependencies that are already pinned.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

cargo-deny's advisories check failed on three RUSTSEC advisories
published against lettre 0.11.23, which the smtp feature builds into
rustock-alerts and so into the node binary:

- RUSTSEC-2026-0560: a man-in-the-middle appends replies to the
  cleartext reply to STARTTLS, and the client takes them for the
  server's replies to the commands it then sends over TLS. A message
  the server rejected can be made to look accepted. Only STARTTLS
  connections are affected (Tls::Required and Tls::Opportunistic, as
  `starttls_relay` sets up, which `TlsMode::Starttls` selects in
  crates/alerts/src/sink.rs); implicit TLS is not.
- RUSTSEC-2026-0561: missing dot-stuffing after a bare LF or CR allows
  SMTP command injection.
- A panic on an EHLO reply line of only white space, a denial of
  service.

All three are fixed in 0.11.24. `cargo update -p lettre` takes
email-encoding 0.4.3 with it, which carries the dot-stuffing fix.

Lockfile only: no manifest changes, and the package count is unchanged
at 469, with nothing added or removed beyond those two versions.
Cargo's re-resolution also moves errno, rustix and tempfile from
windows-sys 0.52.0 to 0.61.2; both were already locked, and both
remain. `cargo metadata --locked` passes and every dependency outside
the workspace still carries a checksum (459 of 469, the other 10 being
the workspace members), which is what the Security workflow asserts.

Found by the advisories job on #374, not by the daily schedule in
security.yml: that cron has never fired since it was added on
11 September 2026 (0 scheduled runs repository-wide). Filed separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@SergioDemianLerner
SergioDemianLerner merged commit 16fa070 into main Nov 18, 2026
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2 participants